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We investigate the ability of an antineutrino detector to determine the fuel type of a reactor.
A hypothetical 5 t antineutrino detector is placed 25 m from the core and measures the spectral
shape and rate of antineutrinos emitted by fission fragments in the core for a number of 90 d
periods. Our results indicate that four major fuel types can be differentiated from the variation of
fission fractions over the irradiation time with a true positive probability of detection at ∼ 95%.
In addition, we demonstrate that antineutrinos can identify the burn-up at which weapons-grade
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel would be reduced to reactor-grade MOX on average, providing assurance
that plutonium disposition goals are met. In addition, we investigate removal scenarios where
plutonium is purposefully diverted from a mixture of MOX and low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel.
Finally, we discuss how our analysis is impacted by a spectral distortion around 6 MeV observed in
the antineutrino spectrum measured from commercial power reactors.
The end of the Cold War after the collapse of the So-
viet Union in 1991 left the United States and Russia
with a large number of surplus nuclear weapons [1]. Ulti-
mately, the plutonium contained in these surplussed nu-
clear weapons needs to be disposed of. There are various
techniques proposed for the disposal of weapons pluto-
nium, see for instance Ref. [2], and one of these tech-
niques is based on so-called mixed oxide fuel (MOX),
where a large part of the fissile content in regular reactor
fuel is replaced with the to-be-disposed plutonium. This
MOX fuel can be used in commercial light-water reactors
and would thus allow one to convert some of the pluto-
nium to usable energy. The remaining plutonium which
is not fissioned will undergo a major change of its iso-
topic composition rendering it less attractive for the use
in nuclear weapons. Moreover, whatever is left will be
embedded in highly radioactive spent reactor fuel, mak-
ing retrieval expensive and difficult. MOX fuel is suc-
cessfully employed in Europe, in particular in France a
significant number of power plants are using MOX fuel
on an ongoing basis. In the MOX approach to plutonium
disposal, the primary quantitative measure of reaching
the disposition goal is given by burn-up: fuel which has
reached a certain burn-up threshold will both have a sig-
nificantly changed mix of plutonium isotopes as well as
be sufficiently protected by its own radiation field. In this
paper we investigate how continuous antineutrino moni-
toring can be used as a complementary verification tech-
nique of both disposal goals by directly measuring the
burn-up and ratio of plutonium-239 to plutonium-241,
which serves as a proxy for the fraction of plutonium-
240; plutonium-240 is not fissile and thus does not have
its own, direct neutrino signature. In addition, we study
the hypothetical scenario of the intentional removal of
plutonium.
The monitoring of nuclear reactors via antineutrino
emission was first postulated nearly 40 years ago by
Borovoi and Mikaelyan [3]. This concept has seen a
recent resurgence as a safeguards or verification tech-
nique [4–9], where antineutrinos offer the unique advan-
tages of independence of operation declarations and the
ability to recover from a loss of continuity [10]. This type
of reactor monitoring would require surface-level detec-
tor technology, which has yet to be demonstrated with
sufficient fidelity but is the current goal of many short-
baseline neutrino experiments [11].
Antineutrino monitoring relies on the fact that fissions
of different fissile nuclides, such as 235,238U or 239,241Pu,
produce different spectral shapes in antineutrino energy.
An overall measurement of the rate of antineutrinos will
determine the power of the reactor, while a spectral de-
composition can infer the core content. These techniques
were employed previously [6, 10] to study the capabili-
ties of antineutrinos based on real-world scenarios. We
use the same process in this work.
Typically, the fuel evolution of the reactor of interest
is simulated, and thus the fission rates throughout the ir-
radiation cycle are obtained. This allows one to compute
the total antineutrino spectrum by weighting these fission
rates with the appropriate antineutrino yields from a sin-
gle fission of each fissioning isotope. The uncertainties in
these yields can be reduced with a previous calibration of
the antineutrino detector to a core with known composi-
tion and we assume this calibration has been performed.
The total antineutrino signal represents the ‘observed’
spectrum in our simulated experiment. The expected
events are separated into energy bins to acquire the spec-
tral shape, represented by
ni = N
∫ Ei+∆E/2
Ei−∆E/2
σ(E) ~F · ~S(E)dE, (1)
with the width of the energy bin ∆E, the interac-
tion cross-section σ(E) [12], the fission rate vector ~F ,
and the vector of antineutrino yields from each fissile
~S(E) [13, 14]. The normalization N takes into ac-
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count the detector size, location1, and overall efficiency.
The choice of ∆E must be small enough to allow for
good resolution in the spectral shape. We have cho-
sen ∆E = 250 keV and a detection threshold of 2 MeV.
Previous large-scale experiments have demonstrated the
ability to reach this level of energy resolution [15–17] and
future short-baseline detectors are aiming to match or ex-
ceed this, see for instance Ref. [18].
One can compute a log-likelihood ratio by comparing
the observed spectrum, created by weighting the simu-
lated fission rate vector ~FS with the fluxes ~S(E), to the
expected spectral shape of Eq. 1. Minimizing the result-
ing χ2-function, given below
χ2( ~F) =
N∑
i
(ni( ~F)− n′i)2
n′i
, (2)
provides the best-fit fission rate vector ~F (or maximum
likelihood estimate), where the observed events from ~FS
in bin i are n′i. This measurement of the fission rate
vector is then used to determine the core type and pro-
gression along its irradiation cycle. Detection statistics
are simulated by randomizing the n′i with a Poisson dis-
tribution. We assume detection statistics dominate the
error budget as precise detector calibration and simula-
tion have been achieved below the few percent level and
accurate background measurements have been incorpo-
rated into previous calibration techniques [19].
The simulated reactor is a Westinghouse-style light wa-
ter reactor (LWR) loaded with various core compositions.
The details of the simulation and the core configuration
and characteristics are given in Ref. [20]. Our analysis
is primarily concerned with four core types. The first is
weapons-grade MOX (WGMOX) used in the LWR, cor-
responding to the actual disposition case. The second
is reactor-grade MOX (RGMOX), which corresponds the
plutonium vector of discharged uranium-based fuel, and
usually is part of a fuel cycle which includes reprocessing
of spent fuel. The third fuel type is a mixture of two-
thirds low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and one third
of WGMOX, where one third corresponds approximately
to the MOX fraction used in France2. Finally, the fourth
core is a full LEU core. Initial fuel compositions are de-
scribed and provided in Ref. [20] for the various cores
considered here. All four cores are simulated to run for a
total of 500 d of irradiation at full power, corresponding
to a burn-up of 21 MW d/kg HM. Thus, the fission rates
from these simulations have an implicit time-dependence
~F(t) and Eq. 1 is modified with an integration over the
detection time T . This implies that the observed spec-
1 We assume a baseline short enough to avoid neutrino oscillations
via active neutrinos.
2 Obviously, France is using RGMOX.
tral shape will depend on when the detector monitors the
reactor.
Two hundred cases were simulated for each of the four
core types and four different detection periods. These
individual cases represent different Poisson-randomized
antineutrino spectra from the simulated fission rates ~FS .
Each case was minimized via Eq. 2 producing a best-
fit core-averaged ~F for that detection period and fuel
content. One can evaluate the best-fit fission rate vec-
tor in various forms, such as the total plutonium fission
fraction versus the plutonium-239 fission fraction as in
Fig. 1. We can see that within the first 90 d measure-
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FIG. 1. Plot of the derived best-fit plutonium and
plutonium-239 fission fractions for four different fuel invento-
ries and four different detection periods. The progression of
fuel is illustrated by the movement of the centroids (stars) for
each set. Black centroids are calculated from the data points
and the gray are directly from the simulated fission rates. The
dashed line is the physically-real plutonium boundary.
ment (i.e. the start time is τ0 = 0 d) the cores appear
as expected. The pure LEU core (blue) contains a ma-
jority of uranium fission and very little plutonium. The
core with one third WGMOX (orange) contains a siz-
able amount of plutonium initially and the plutonium
is a high-percentage plutonium-239, as the centroid falls
near the pure plutonium-239 dashed line. For the MOX
cores, the reactor-grade plutonium (red) begins far from
the purity line and has mostly plutonium fissions. The
WGMOX core (purple) begins on the purity line and also
has a majority of plutonium fissions. The black centroids
are found by evenly weighting all data points in a partic-
ular set, including those that fall in non-physical regimes,
such as points beyond the pure plutonium-239 line. The
gray centroids mark the time-averaged value of the fission
quantity during its irradiation period, directly calculated
from the simulated time-dependent fission rates.
From Fig. 1 we note that the initial state of the mixed
LEU+WGMOX core looks nearly identical to that of the
last detection period of the pure LEU core. This de-
generacy can be broken when we consider continuous
2
antineutrino monitoring. With continuous monitoring,
one would know the starting irradiation time and relative
power from the rate measurement. With multiple mea-
surements of the antineutrino spectrum one could infer
core inventory based on the trajectory of two consecu-
tive measurements, say τ0 = 0 d and τ0 = 100 d. A tra-
jectory that moves along the pure plutonium-239 line is
comprised of mostly LEU. Horizontal shifts are cores that
contain mostly MOX. We also note that the antineutrino-
derived fission fractions (black stars) are within a few
percent of the simulated values (gray stars) in Fig. 1.
To acquire information on the plutonium grade, an im-
portant factor in weapons-production [21], one can use a
ratio of the plutonium fission rates. We use the ratio
of plutonium-239 fission rate to the total plutonium fis-
sion rate, which we label as the plutonium fission grade
(GPu). Using GPu = 90% as the disposition goal
3, we
find based on the antineutrino measurement alone that
16% (31%) of WGMOX (LEU+MOX) cores remained
above this goal at the final (410 − 500 d) measurement
period. The sensitivity to downgrading the plutonium
is worse in the mixed core as the uranium absorbs some
of the total fission rates, thus slowing the progression of
plutonium fissions from weapons-grade to reactor-grade.
In addition, this measurement represents a core-averaged
plutonium ratio, so a lower GPu requirement would be
necessary to ensure all assemblies fall below the weapons-
barrier or an assembly-by-assembly technique would need
to be employed as well [22].
The trajectory and the absolute distance traveled in
the fission quantity plane can be calculated from Fig. 1
and compared between different cores and different mea-
surement periods. For example, the LEU cores both
travel along the same trajectory, but the pure LEU core
has a much larger difference between two adjacent mea-
surement periods than the mixed core. This quantity,
which we label the differential burn-up, is given by
∆~F =
~F (tf )− ~F (ti)
~F (tf )
, (3)
where the fission fraction ~F (t) is created from the best-fit
values of the fission rate vector ~F(t). We have computed
the differential burn-up between the four measurement
periods for each of the four simulated cores in Tab. I. The
trends noted above appear quantitatively in this differ-
ential burn-up analysis (DBA). For example, both LEU-
type cores have a positive ∆FPu across all time steps, in-
dicating that these cores are producing plutonium. How-
ever, the LEU core mixed with WG plutonium has a sig-
nificantly smaller ∆FPu indicating that the rate of pluto-
nium production in the mixed core is dramatically slower
3 The thermal fission cross section of 241Pu is 35% higher than the
one of 239Pu, thus in a mixture of 93% 239Pu and 7% 241Pu 90%
of all fission will take place in 241Pu.
Differential Burn-up [∆FPu239,∆FPu] in percent
τ0 = 100 d τ0 = 300 d τ0 = 410 d
LEU [218, 201] [498, 493] [589, 616]
2/3 LEU [11.8, 16.1] [33.2, 46.6] [39.9, 59.5]
RGMOX [−2.05,−0.01] [−5.96,−0.10] [−7.10, 0.17]
WGMOX [−3.20,−0.39] [−8.41,−0.25] [−12.0,−0.23]
Nominal [8.40, 14.0] [30.0, 38.0] [31.1, 48.9]
8 Rem. [10.1, 14.6] [30.3, 40.9] [40.9, 54.2]
20 Rem. [20.5, 20.5] [44.9, 52.1] [57.4, 68.2]
TABLE I. Differential burn-up analysis (DBA) of the
plutonium-239 fission fraction ∆FPu239 and the plutonium fis-
sion fraction ∆FPu between the initial τ0 = 0 d measurement
period and the three following measurement periods in per-
cent. The DBA is conducted for the four simulated cores and
is given as ordered pairs. Also listed are the DBA results for
the removal cases where no fresh WGMOX assemblies (Nom-
inal), 8, or all 20 are replaced with LEU fuel.
by about an order of magnitude for all time steps. In ad-
dition, the grade of the plutonium decreases faster for the
WGMOX core than the RGMOX core. This difference is
much more subtle and develops slowly, but results in an
almost doubling of |∆FPu239|, as can be seen in Tab. I.
Another possible scenario is the intentional removal of
plutonium from a core, such as the mixed LEU and WG-
MOX core [20]. The mixed core uses a total of 48 MOX
assemblies, 28 of which are once or twice-irradiated and
therefore not considered WGMOX any longer. This stag-
gered burning is used in reactor operation to flatten the
neutron spectrum distribution. We investigate three sce-
narios: the first is the nominal run with no removal of
the fresh WGMOX assemblies. The second considers re-
moving 8 fresh WGMOX assemblies from the periphery
of the reactor and replacing them with LEU assemblies.
The fission rate at the edge of the reactor core is rela-
tively low and thus this case will be a particular challenge
for antineutrino monitoring. The final case considers a
full removal and replacement of all (20) fresh WGMOX
assemblies. We plot these scenarios and their exclusion
contours in the FPu239 – FPu plane for the initial and final
time-step in Fig. 2. For the removal cases, we see that
the differential burn-up vectors are all aligned in rela-
tively the same direction, but the magnitudes are slightly
different. One can also note that the differences between
the removal cases are much less pronounced than those
for the full cores, as seen in Tab. I. Furthermore, it be-
comes apparent that the equilibrium fission rates for each
scenario are nearly identical, making this difference more
difficult to detect at later irradiation times.
The analyses in Figs. 1, 2, and Tab. I demonstrate the
process by which an antineutrino detector would infer
the core content of a nuclear reactor. Several time steps
are needed to determine the progression of the fuel and
3
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FIG. 2. Plot of the allowed region contours of the best-
fit plutonium-239 and total plutonium fission fractions. The
contours are derived by fitting Gaussian ellipses to the case
distribution. The thick inner ellipse denotes the 1σ quartile
and the thin outer ellipse the 2σ quartile. Centroids derived
from the ellipses (black) and from the simulated fission rates
(gray) are shown. The dashed line is the physically-real plu-
tonium boundary.
identify the differential burn-up. The sign and magni-
tude resulting from DBA can distinguish between LEU,
mixed LEU and MOX, and MOX cores easily, but the
difference between RGMOX and WGMOX is more sub-
tle. An absolute measurement of the fission fractions can
help to distinguish the latter cases. Next, we present the
sensitivity analysis for these absolute measurements.
It is now possible to determine the true and false pos-
itive rates (FPR) from the data generated so far. In
Fig. 3, we project the data onto the axis represented by
the fission fraction of plutonium-239. For each of the
histograms we can determine the parameters of a nor-
mal distribution, that is the mean and standard devi-
ation. The resulting normal distributions are used to
compute the true and false positive rates as a function
of the plutonium-239 fission fraction. To allow a simple
summary, we chose the critical value in this variable such
that the false negative and false positive rates are equal
and we will quote this common value. In the language of
a receiver operating characteristics, this corresponds to
the balance point.
One can determine the false positive rate and the
balance point for the four core and measurement pe-
riod distributions along the various fission fraction axes.
First, the simulated experiments are binned along an
axis; Fig. 3 provides the projection of Fig. 1 onto its
x-axis of plutonium-239 fission fraction. As one would
expect from Fig. 3, we observe a very small FPR during
the first measurement period (∼ 0.1% between the LEU
cores and ∼ 0.4% between the MOX cores). The sec-
ond measurement shows more significant FPR of ∼ 1%
between both the LEU cores and both the MOX cores.
The third measurement begins to show a higher FPR
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FIG. 3. Histogram of the determined plutonium-239 fission
fraction of the simulated cases for the first and last measure-
ment times and four core compositions and the corresponding
Gaussian distributions. This represents Fig. 1 projected onto
its x-axis.
between the RGMOX and mixed LEU+WGMOX cores,
but only around 0.3%. The FPR between the LEU cores
is ∼ 3% and between the MOX cores is ∼ 1.8%. The
last measurement shows a FPR between the LEU cores
at 4.6%, between the MOX cores at 4.6%, and between
the LEU+WGMOX and RGMOX cores at ∼ 1.3%. The
information for the first and last measurements is given
quantitatively in Tab. II.
The low FPR indicate that only ∼ 5% of cases will
be misidentified. Multiple tests with different ~F (t) can
isolate and enhance this accuracy. For example, the plu-
tonium or uranium fission fraction has very good separa-
tion between the LEU and pure MOX cores, but is com-
pletely unable to distinguish between RGMOX and WG-
MOX. Using the plutonium-239 grade, the FPR drops by
about a factor of 3 between the RGMOX and WGMOX
cores, but increases drastically for the LEU cores due to
the lower plutonium fission fractions. For the removal
scenarios, the FPRs are consistently above 50% among
all measurements, removal scenarios, and fission fraction
tests, implying that detection of those is beyond the ca-
pabilities of antineutrino monitoring. This is primarily
because antineutrinos measure core-averaged quantities
instead of individual assemblies.
Recently, a spectral distortion was observed near
5 MeV (positron energy) in the reactor antineutrino flux
of multiple large-statistics experiments [15–17]. The ori-
gin of this so-called bump is unknown, but several theo-
ries have been explored [23–25]. Irrespective of the bump
explanation, one can verify the impact of the spectral fea-
ture on the fuel determination by artificially placing the
observed bump in the converted antineutrino fluxes.
We choose to place the spectral feature in either
uranium-235 or plutonium-239. Using Fig. 2 in Ref. [15],
the bump is modeled as a Gaussian distribution where
4
False Positive Rates
No Bump U235 Bump Pu239 Bump
LEU+MOX RGMOX WGMOX LEU+MOX RGMOX WGMOX LEU+MOX RGMOX WGMOX
First
LEU 0.119% < 10−4% < 10−4% 0.00380% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4%
LEU+MOX < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4%
RGMOX 0.377% 0.0318% < 10−4%
Last
LEU 4.60% 0.00290% < 10−4% 0.612% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4%
LEU+MOX 1.31% 0.00385% 0.0533% < 10−4% < 10−4% < 10−4%
RGMOX 4.61% 1.21% < 10−4%
TABLE II. Upper triangular portion of the core separation FPR matrices using the plutonium-239 fission fraction. Each upper
triangular cell corresponds to the percentage of falsely identified cores between the various core compositions. This is done for
the three considered locations of the spectral structure (no bump, a uranium-235 bump, and a plutonium-239 bump) and for
the first (τ0 = 0 d) and last (τ0 = 410 d) measurement periods. The total FPR matrix is symmetric, as expected. A reduction
in the FPR by about a factor of 3 occurs between the RGMOX and WGMOX cores when using the plutonium grade as a
diagnostic.
the mean and variance are determined by a least-squares
fit. We note that the normalization of the Gaussian is
fixed by the fission fractions and overall neutrino rate in
the relevant bins. The three Gaussian best-fit parame-
ters vary by only a small amount when fixing them in-
stead by Ref. [16] or Ref. [17]. With these new artificial
fluxes, we repeat the process outlined above and gener-
ate more sample simulations. As expected, a new spec-
tral distortion in either uranium-235 or plutonium-239
enhances the abilities of an antineutrino detector to dis-
tinguish between fuel types. A bump in uranium-235 has
the effect of pinching the spread of FPu in Fig. 1 as the
uranium-235 fission rate, now easily determined by the
spectral distortion, essentially fixes the total plutonium
fissions. A bump in plutonium-239 pinches the distribu-
tions along an axis in the FPu239 – FPu plane, according
to the core content. This also has the effect of reduc-
ing the variance in the Gaussian distributions found in
Fig. 3, which lowers the FPRs. Overall, Tab. II shows
that this procedure reduces the FPR by at least a factor
of 3 if the uranium-235 spectrum contains the bump and
below 10−4% for a plutonium-239 bump. The FPR rates
remain at or above ∼ 50% for all removal scenarios across
all measurement periods. The sensitivity to downgrad-
ing is also enhanced by the bump location. Less than
1% (20%) of the WGMOX (LEU+MOX) cores return
plutonium fission grades above weapons at the last mea-
surement period with a plutonium-239 bump.
This work has explored the abilities of a surface-
deployed antineutrino detector to determine the core
composition of the reactor it is monitoring via contin-
uous spectral and rate measurements. The spectrum,
with an interaction threshold of 2 MeV and binned into
250 keV bins, is fitted to an event distribution provid-
ing best-fit values for the fission rates of 235,238U and
239,241Pu. These best-fit fission rates are combined into
various fractions and we determine that for 500 d of ir-
radiation in a LWR, which will downgrade a full WG-
MOX core to RGMOX, we can establish this average
downgrade with 84% confidence based on antineutrino
monitoring. For a one-third WGMOX two-thirds LEU
core we can determine the average downgrade with 69%
confidence. Multiple measurement periods of 90 d within
the irradiation cycle can differentiate between our four
major core compositions with 95% accuracy. This is
done mostly by comparing the plutonium-239 fission frac-
tion, but can be reinforced with other fission fractions as
well. Detecting the removal of plutonium from a mixed
LEU and WGMOX core with an antineutrino detector is
found to be incredibly difficult and highly reliant on the
first measurement period. The existence of a spectral
distortion in either the uranium-235 or plutonium-239
antineutrino fluxes only enhances the monitoring capa-
bilities mentioned above, except for the detection of an
intentional removal of plutonium.
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